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Abstract
Small changes to the parameters of a system can lead to abrupt qualitative changes of
its behavior, a phenomenon known as bifurcation. Such instabilities are typically considered
problematic, however, we show that their power can be leveraged to design novel types of
mechanisms. Hysteresis mechanisms use transient changes of system parameters to induce a
permanent improvement to its performance via optimal equilibrium selection. Optimal control
mechanisms induce convergence to states whose performance is better than even the best
equilibrium. We apply these mechanisms in two different settings that illustrate the versatility
of bifurcation mechanism design. In the first one we explore how introducing flat taxation
can improve social welfare, despite decreasing agent “rationality”, by destabilizing inefficient
equilibria. From there we move on to consider a well known game of tumor metabolism and use
our approach to derive novel cancer treatment strategies.
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-0435060, grant
CCR-0325197 and grant EN-CS-0329609.
1 Introduction
The term bifurcation, which means splitting in two, is used to describe abrupt qualitative changes
in system behavior due to smooth variation of its parameters. Bifurcations are ubiquitous and
permeate all natural phenomena. Effectively, they produce discrete events (e.g., rain breaking
out) out of smoothly varying, continuous systems (e.g., small changes to humidity, temperature).
Typically, they are studied through bifurcation diagrams, multi-valued maps that prescribe how
each parameter configuration translates to possible system behaviors (e.g., Figure 1).
Bifurcations arise in a natural way in game theory. Games are typically studied through their
Nash correspondences, a multi-valued map connecting the parameters of the game (i.e., payoff
matrices) to system behavior, in this case Nash equilibria. As we slowly vary the parameters of the
game typically the Nash equilibria will also vary smoothly, except at bifurcation points where, for
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example, the number of equilibria abruptly changes as some equilibria appear/disappear altogether.
Such singularities may a have huge impact both on system behavior and system performance. For
example, if the system state was at an equilibrium that disappeared during the bifurcation, then
a turbulent transitionary period ensues where the system tries to reorganize itself at one of the
remaining equilibria. Moreover, the quality of all remaining equilibria may be significantly worse
than the original. Even more disturbingly, it is not a-priori clear that the system will equilibrate
at all. Successive bifurcations that lead to increasingly more complicated recurrent behavior is a
standard route to chaos Devaney [1992], which may have devastating effects to system performance.
Game theorists are particularly aware of the need to produce “robust” predictions that are not
inherently bound to a specific, exact instantiation of the payoff parameters of the game Roughgarden
[2009]. The typical way to approach this problem has been to focus on more expansive solution
concepts, e.g., -approximate Nash equilibria or even outcomes approximately consistent to regret-
minimizing learning. These approaches, however, do not really address the problem at its core as
any solution concept defines a map from parameter space to behavioral space and no such map is
immune to bifurcations. If pushed hard enough any system will destabilize. The question is what
happens next?
Well, a lot of things may happen. It is intuitively clear that if we are allowed to play around
arbitrarily with the payoffs of the agents then we can reproduce any game and no meaningful
analysis is possible. Using payoff entries as controlling parameters is problematic for another reason.
It is not clear that there exists a compelling parametrization of the payoff space that captures how
real life decision makers deviate from the Platonic ideal of the payoff matrix. Instead, we focus on
another popular aspect of economic theory, agent “rationality”.
We adopt a standard model of boundedly rational learning agents. Boltzmann Q-learning
dynamics Tan [1993], Watkins and Dayan [1992], Watkins [1989] is a well studied behavioral model
in which agents are parameterized by a temperature/rationality term T . Each agent keeps track of
the collective past performance of his actions (i.e., learns from experience) and chooses an action
according to a Boltzmann/Gibbs distribution with parameter T . When applied to a multi-agent
game the behavioral fixed points of Q-learning are known as quantal response equilibria (QRE)
McKelvey and Palfrey [1995]. Naturally, QREs depend on the temperature T . As T → 0 players
become perfectly rational and play approaches a Nash equilibrium,1 whereas as T →∞ all agents
use uniformly random strategies. As we vary the temperature the QRE(T ) correspondence moves
between these two extremes producing bifurcations along the way at critical points where the
number of QREs changes (Figure 1).
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the effects of these rationality-driven bifurcations to the
social welfare of two player two strategy games. At this point a moment of pause is warranted. Why
is this a worthy goal? Games of small size (2× 2 games in particular) hardly seem like a subject
worthy of serious scientific investigation. This, however, could not be further from the truth.
First, the correct way to interpret this setting is from the point of population games where each
agent is better understood as a large homogeneous population (e.g. men and women, attackers
and defenders, cells of type A and cells of type B). Each of a handful of different types of users
has only a few meaningful actions available to them. In fact, from the perspective of applied game
theory only such games with a small number of parameters are practically meaningful. The reason
should be clear by now. Any game theoretic modeling of a real life scenario is invariably noisy and
inaccurate. In order for game-theoretic predictions to be practically binding they have to be robust
1Mixed strategies in the QRE model are sometimes interpreted as frequency distributions of deterministic actions
in a large population of users. This population interpretation of mixed strategies is standard and dates back to
Nash Nash [1950]. Depending on context, we will use either the probabilistic interpretation or the population one.
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram for a 2× 2 population coordination game. The x axis corresponds
to the system temperature T , whereas the y axis corresponds to the projection of the proportion
of the first population using the first strategy at equilibrium. For small T , the system exhibits
multiple equilibria. Starting at T = 0, and by increasing the temperature beyond the critical
threshold TC = 6, and then bringing it back to zero, we can force the system to converge to another
equilibrium.
to these uncertainties. If the system intrinsically has a large number of independent parameters e.g.,
20, then this parameter space will almost certainly encode a vast number of bifurcations, which
invalidate any theoretical prediction. Practically useful models need to be small.
Secondly, game theoretic models applied for scientific purposes typically are small. Specifically,
the exact setting studied here with Boltzmann Q-learning dynamics applied in 2 × 2 games has
been used to model the effects of taxation to agent rationality Wolpert et al. [2012] (see Section 6.1
for a more extensive discussion) as well as to model the effects of treatments that trigger phase
transitions to cancer dynamics Kianercy et al. [2014] (see Section 6.2). Our approach yields insights
to explicit open questions in both of these applications areas. In fact, direct application of our
analysis can address similar inquiries for any other phenomenon modeled by Q-learning dynamics
applied in 2× 2 games.
Finally, the analysis itself is far from straightforward as it requires combining sets of tools and
techniques that have so far been developed in isolation from each other. On one hand, we need
to understand the behavior of these dynamical systems using tools from topology of dynamical
systems whose implications are largely qualitative (e.g. prove the lack of cyclic trajectories). On the
other hand, we need to leverage these tools to quantify at which exact parameter values bifurcations
occur and produce price-of-anarchy type of guarantees which by definition are quantitative. As far
as we know, this is the first instance of a fruitful combination of these tools. In fact, not only do we
show how to analyze the effects of bifurcations to system efficiency, we also show how to leverage
this understanding (e.g. knowledge of the geometry of the bifurcation diagrams) to design novel
types of mechanisms with good performance guarantees.
Our contribution.
We introduce two different types of mechanisms, hysteresis and optimal control mechanisms.
Hysteresis mechanisms use transient changes to the system parameters to induce permanent
improvements to its performance via optimal (Nash) equilibrium selection. The term hysteresis is
derived from an ancient Greek word that means “to lag behind”. It reflects a time-based dependence
between the system’s present output and its past inputs. For example, let’s assume that we start
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from a game theoretic system of Q-learning agents with temperature T = 0 and assume that
the system has converged to an equilibrium. By increasing the temperature beyond some critical
threshold and then bringing it back to zero, we can force the system to provably converge to
another equilibrium, e.g., the best (Nash) equilibrium (Figure 1, Theorem 4). Thus, we can ensure
performance equivalent to that of the price of stability instead of the price of anarchy. One attractive
feature of this mechanism is that from the perspective of the central designer it is rather “cheap” to
implement. Whereas typical mechanisms require the designer to continuously intervene by (e.g.,
by paying the agents) to offset their greedy tendencies this mechanism is transient with a finite
amount of total effort from the perspective of the designer. Further, the idea that game theoretic
systems have effectively systemic memory is rather interesting and could find other applications
within algorithmic game theory.
Optimal control mechanisms induce convergence to states whose performance is better than
even the best Nash equilibrium. Thus, we can at times even beat the price of stability (Theorem
5). Specifically, we show that by controlling the exploration/exploitation tradeoff we can achieve
strictly better states than those achievable by perfectly rational agents. In order to implement such
a mechanism it does not suffice to identify the right set of agents’ parameters/temperatures so that
the system has some QRE whose social welfare is better than the best Nash. We need to design a
trajectory through the parameter space so that this optimal QRE becomes the final resting point.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Game Theory Basics: 2× 2 games
In this paper, we focus on 2× 2 games. We define it as a game with two players, and each player
has two actions. We write the payoff matrices of the game for each player as
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, B =
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
(1)
respectively. The entry aij denotes the payoff for Player 1 when he chooses action i and his opponent
chooses action j; similarly, bij denotes the payoff for Player 2 when he chooses action i and his
opponent chooses action j. We define x as the probability that the Player 1 chooses his first action,
and y as the probability that Player 2 chooses his first action. We also define two row vectors
x = (x, 1− x)T and y = (y, 1− y)T as the strategy for each player. For simplicity, we denote the
i-th entry of vector x by xi. We call the tuple (x, y) as the system state or the strategy profile.
An important solution concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium, where each user cannot
make profit by unilaterally changing his strategy, that is:
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile (xNE , yNE) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
xNE ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
xTAyNE , yNE ∈ arg max
y∈[0,1]
yTBxNE
We call (xNE , yNE) a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if both xNE ∈ {0, 1} and yNE ∈ {0, 1}.
Nash equilibrium assumes each user is fully rational. However, in real world, this assumption is
impractical. An alternative solution concept is the quantal response equilibrium McKelvey and
Palfrey [1995], where it assumes that each user has bounded rationality:
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Definition 2 (Quantal response equilibrium). A strategy profile (xQRE , yQRE) is a Quantal response
equilibrium (QRE) with respect to temperature Tx and Ty if
xQRE =
e
1
Tx
(AyQRE)1∑
j∈{1,2} e
1
Tx
(AyQRE)j
, 1− xQRE = e
1
Tx
(AyQRE)2∑
j∈{1,2} e
1
Tx
(AyQRE)j
yQRE =
e
1
Ty
(BxQRE)1∑
j∈{1,2} e
1
Ty
(BxQRE)j
, 1− yQRE = e
1
Ty
(BxQRE)2∑
j∈{1,2} e
1
Ty
(BxQRE)j
Analogous to the definition of Nash equilibria, we can consider the QREs as the case that each
player is not only maximizing the expected utility but also maximizing the entropy. We can see
that the QREs are the solutions to maximizing the linear combination of the following program:
xQRE ∈ arg max
x
xTAyQRE − Tx∑
j
xj lnxj

yQRE ∈ arg max
y
yTBxQRE − Ty∑
j
yj ln yj

This formulation has been widely seen in Q-learning dynamics literature (e.g Cominetti et al. [2010],
Coucheney et al. [2013], Wolpert et al. [2012]). With this formulation, we can find that the two
parameters Tx and Ty controls the weighting between the utility and the entropy. We call Tx and
Ty the temperatures, and their value defines the level of irrationality. If Tx and Ty are zero, then
both players are fully rational, and the system state is a Nash equilibrium. However, if both Tx and
Ty are infinity, then each player is choosing his action according to a uniform distribution, which
corresponds to the fully irrational players.
2.2 Efficiency of an equilibrium
The performance of a system state can be measured via the social welfare. Given a system state
(x, y), we define the social welfare as the sum of the expected payoff of all users in the system:
Definition 3. Given 2 × 2 game with payoff matrices A and B, and a system state (x, y), the
social welfare is defined as
SW (x, y) = xy(a11 + b11) + x(1− y)(a12 + b21) + y(1− x)(a21 + b12) + (1− x)(1− y)(a22 + b22)
In the context of algorithmic game theory, we can measure the efficiency of a game by comparing
the social welfare of a equilibrium system state with the best social welfare. We call the strategy
profile that achieves the maximal social welfare as the socially optimal (SO) strategy profile. The
efficiency of a game is often described as the notion of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability
(PoS). They are defined as
Definition 4. Given 2× 2 game with payoff matrices A and B, and a set of equilibrium system
states S ⊆ [0, 1]2, the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) are defined as
PoA(S) =
max(x,y)∈[0,1]2 SW (x, y)
min(x,y)∈S SW (x, y)
, PoS(S) =
max(x,y)∈[0,1]2 SW (x, y)
max(x,y)∈S SW (x, y)
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3 Our Model
3.1 Q-learning Dynamics
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the scenario when both players’ strategies are evolving
under Q-learning dynamics:
x˙i = xi
[
(Ay)i − xTAy + Tx
∑
j
xj ln(xj/xi)
]
, y˙i = yi
[
(Bx)i − yTBx+ Ty
∑
j
yj ln(yj/yi)
]
(2)
The Q-learning dynamics has been studied because of its connection with multi-agent learning
problems. For example, it has been shown in Sato and Crutchfield [2003], Tuyls et al. [2003] that
the Q-learning dynamics captures the system evolution of a repeated game, where each player
learns his strategy through Q-learning and Boltzmann selection rules. More details are provided in
Appendix A.
An important observation on the dynamics (2) is that it demonstrates the exploration/ exploita-
tion tradeoff Tuyls et al. [2003]. We can find that the right hand side of equation (2) is composed
of two parts. The first part xi[(Ay)i − xTAy] is exactly the vector field of replicator dynamic
Sandholm [2009]. Basically, the replicator dynamics drives the system to the state of higher utility
for both players. As a result, we can consider this as a selection process in terms of population
evolutionary, or an exploitation process from the perspective of a learning agent. Then, for the
second part xi[Tx
∑
j xj ln(xj/xi)], we show in the appendix that if the time derivative of x contains
this part alone, this results in the increase of the system entropy.
The system entropy is a function that captures the randomness of the system. From the
population evolutionary perspective, the system entropy corresponds to the variety of the population.
As a result, this term can be considered as the mutation process. The level of the mutation is
controlled by the temperature parameters Tx and Ty. Besides, in terms of the reinforcement learning,
this term can be considered as an exploration process, as it provides the opportunity for the agent
to gain information about the action that does not look the best so far.
3.2 Convergence of the Q-learning dynamics
By observing the Q-learning dynamics (2), we can find that the interior rest points for the dynamics
are exactly the QREs of the 2 × 2 game. It is claimed in Kianercy and Galstyan [2012] without
proof that the Q-learning dynamics for a 2× 2 game converges to interior rest points of probability
simplexes for any positive temperature Tx > 0 and Ty > 0. We provide a formal proof in Appendix
B. The idea is that for positive temperature, the system is dissipative and by leveraging the planar
nature of the system it can be argued that it converges to fixed points.
3.3 Rescaling the Payoff Matrix
At the end of this section, we discuss the transformation of the payoff matrices that preserves the
dynamics in (2). This idea is proposed in Hofbauer and Hopkins [2005] and Hofbauer and Sigmund
[1998], where the rescaling of a matrix is defined as follows
Definition 5 (Hofbauer and Sigmund [1998]). A′ and B′ is said to be a rescaling of A and B if
there exist constants cj , di, and α > 0, β > 0 such that a
′
ij = αaij + cj and b
′
ji = βbji + di.
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Figure 2: Example 1, Ty = 0.5. Figure 3: Example 1, Ty = 2.
It is clear that rescaling the game payoff matrices is equivalent to updating the temperature
parameters of the two agents in (2). So, wlog it suffices to study the dynamics under the assumption
that the 2× 2 payoff matrices A and B are in the following diagonal form.
Definition 6. Given 2× 2 matrices A and B, their diagonal form is defined as
AD =
(
a11 − a21 0
0 a22 − a12
)
, BD =
(
b11 − b21 0
0 b22 − b12
)
Note that although rescaling the payoff matrices to their diagonal form preserves the equilibria, it
does not preserves the social optimality, i.e. the socially optimal strategy profile in the transformed
game is not necessary the socially optimal strategy profile in the original game.
4 Hysteresis Effect and Bifurcation Analysis
4.1 Hysteresis effect in Q-learning dynamics: An example
We begin our discussion with an example:
Example 1 (Hysteresis effect). Consider a 2× 2 game with reward matrices
A =
(
10 0
0 5
)
, B =
(
2 0
0 4
)
(3)
There are two PNEs in this game, (x, y) = (0, 0) and (1, 1). By fixing some Ty, we can plot
different QREs with respect to Tx as in Figure 2 and Figure 3. For simplicity, we only show the value
of x in the figure, since according to (4), given x and Ty, the value of y can be uniquely determined.
Assuming the system follows the Q-learning dynamics, as we slowly vary Tx, x tends to stay on the
line segment that is the closest to where it was originally corresponding to a stable but inefficient
fixed point. We consider the following process:
1. The initial state is (0.05, 0.14), where Tx ≈ 1 and Ty ≈ 2. We plot x versus Tx by fixing
Ty = 2 in Figure 3.
2. Fix Ty = 2, and increase Tx to where there is only one QRE correspondence.
3. Fix Ty = 2, and decrease Tx back to 1. Now x ≈ 0.997.
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In the above example, we can find that although at the end the temperature parameters are
set back to their initial value, the system state ends up to be a totally different equilibrium. This
behavior is known as the hysteresis effect. In this section, we would like to answer the question when
this is going to happen. Further, in the next section, we will answer how can we take advantage of
this phenomenon.
4.2 Characterizing QREs
We consider the bifurcation diagrams for QREs in 2 × 2 games. Without loss of generality, we
consider a properly rescaled 2× 2 game with payoff matrices in the diagonal form:
AD =
(
aX 0
0 bX
)
, BD =
(
aY 0
0 bY
)
Also, we can assume the action indices are ordered properly and rescaled properly so that aX > 0
and |aX | ≥ |bX |. For simplicity, we assume aX = bX and bX = bY do not hold at the same time. At
QRE, we have
x =
e
1
Tx
yaX
e
1
Tx
yaX + e
1
Tx
(1−y)bX
, y =
e
1
Ty
xaY
e
1
Ty
xaY + e
1
Ty
(1−x)bY
(4)
Given Tx and Ty, there could be multiple solutions to (4). However, we find that if we know the
equilibrium states, then we can recover the temperature parameters. We solve for Tx and Ty in (4),
and then we get
T IX(x, y) =
−(aX + bX)y + bX
ln( 1x − 1)
, T IY (x, y) =
−(aY + bY )x+ bY
ln( 1y − 1)
(5)
We call this the first form of representation, where Tx and Ty are written as functions of x and
y. Here the capital subscripts for TX and TY indicate that they are considered as functions. A
direct observation to (5) is that both of them are continuous function over (0, 1)× (0, 1) except for
x = 1/2 and y = 1/2.
An alternative way to describe the QRE is to write Tx and y as a function of x and parameterize
with respect to Ty in the following second form of representation. This will be the form that we use
to prove many useful characteristics of QREs.
T IIX (x, Ty) =
−(aX + bX)yII(x, Ty) + bX
ln( 1x − 1)
(6)
yII(x, Ty) =
(
1 + e
1
Ty
(−(aY +bY )x+bY )
)−1
(7)
In this way, if we are given Ty, we are able to analyze how Tx changes with x. This helps us
understand how to answer the question of what are the QREs given Tx and Tx in the system.
We also want to analyze the stability of the QREs. From dynamical system theory (e.g. Perko
[1991]), a fixed point of a dynamical system is said to be asymptotically stable if all of the eigenvalues
of its Jacobian matrix has negative real part; if it has at least one eigenvalue with positive real part,
then it is unstable. It turns out that under the second form representation, we are able to determine
whether a segment in the diagram is stable or not.
Lemma 1. Given Ty, the system state
(
x, yII(x, Ty)
)
is a stable equilibrium if and only if
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1.
∂T IIX
∂x (x, TY ) > 0 if x ∈ (0, 1/2).
2.
∂T IIX
∂x (x, TY ) < 0 if x ∈ (1/2, 1).
Proof. The given condition is equivalent to the case that both eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of
the dynamics (2) are negative.
Finally, we define the principal branch. In Example 1, we call the branch on x ∈ (0.5, 1)
the principal branch given Ty = 2, since for any Tx > 0, there is some x ∈ (0.5, 1) such that
T IIX (x, Ty) = Tx. Analogously, we can define it formally as in the following definition with the help
of the second form representation.
Definition 7. Given Ty, the region (a, b) ⊂ (0, 1) contains the principal branch of QRE correspon-
dence if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. T IIX (x, Ty) is continuous and differentiable for x ∈ (a, b).
2. T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈ (a, b).
3. For any Tx > 0, there exists x ∈ (a, b) such that T IIX (x, Ty) = Tx.
Further, for a region (a, b) that contains the principal branch, x ∈ (a, b) is on the principal branch
if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. The equilibrium state (x, yII(x, Ty)) is stable.
2. There is no x′ ∈ (a, b), x′ < x such that T IIX (x′, Ty) = T IIX (x, Ty).
4.3 Coordination Games
We begin our analysis with the class of coordination games, where we have all aX , bX , aY , and bY
positive. Also, without loss of generality, we assume aX ≥ bX . In this case, there are no dominant
strategy for both players, and there are two PNEs.
Let us revisit Example 1, we can make the following observations from Figure 2 and Figure 3:
1. Given Ty, there are three branches. One is the principal branch, while the other two appear
in pairs and occur only when Tx is less than some value.
2. For small Ty, the principal branch goes toward x = 0; while for large Ty, the principal branch
goes toward x = 1.
Now, we are going to show that these observations are generally true in coordination games.
The proofs in this section are deferred to Appendix D, where we will give a detailed discussion on
the proving techniques.
The first idea we are going to introduce is the inverting temperature, which is the threshold of
Ty in Observation (2). We define it as
TI = max
{
0,
bY − aY
2 ln(aX/bX)
}
We note that TI is positive only if bY > aY , which is the case that two players have different
preferences. When Ty < TI , as the first player increases his rationality from fully irrational, i.e.
Tx decreases from infinity, he is likely to be influenced by the second player’s preference. If Ty is
greater than TI , then the first player prefers to follow his own preference, making the principal
branch goes toward x = 1. We formalize this idea in the following theorem:
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Theorem 1 (Direction of the principal branch). Given a 2× 2 coordination game, and given Ty,
the following statements are true:
1. If Ty > TI , then (0.5, 1) contains the principal branch.
2. If Ty < TI , then (0, 0.5) contains the principal branch.
The second idea is the critical temperature, denoted as TC(Ty), which is a function of Ty. The
critical temperature is defined as the infimum of Tx such that for any Tx > TC(Ty), there is a unique
QRE correspondence under (Tx, Ty). Generally, there is no close form for the critical temperature.
However, we can still compute it efficiently, as we show it in Theorem 2. Besides, another interesting
value of Ty we should be noticed is TB =
bY
ln(aX/bX)
, which is the maximum value of Ty that QREs
not on the principal branch are presenting. Intuitively, as Ty goes beyond TB, the first player ignores
the decision of the second player and turn his face to what he think is better. We formalize the idea
of TC and TB in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Properties about the second QRE). Given a 2× 2 coordination game, and given Ty,
the following statements are true:
1. For almost every Tx > 0, all QREs not lying on the principal branch appear in pairs.
2. If Ty > TB, then there is no QRE correspondence in x ∈ (0, 0.5).
3. If Ty > TI , then there is no QRE correspondence for Tx > TC(Ty) in x ∈ (0, 0.5).
4. If Ty < TI , then there is no QRE correspondence for Tx > TC(Ty) in x ∈ (0.5, 1).
5. TC(Ty) is given as T
II
X (xL, Ty), where xL is the solution to the equality
yII(x, Ty) + x(1− x) ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
(x, Ty) =
bX
aX + bX
6. xL can be found using binary search.
The next aspect of the QRE correspondence is their stability. According to Lemma 1, the
stability of the QREs can also be inspected with the advantage of the second form representation
by analyzing
∂T IIX
∂x . We state the results in the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Stability). Given a 2× 2 coordination game, and given Ty, the following statements
are true:
1. If aY ≥ bY , then the principal branch is continuous.
2. If Ty < TI , then the principal branch is continuous.
3. If Ty > TI and aY < bY , then the principal branch may not be continuous.
4. Fix Tx, for the pairs of QREs not lying on the principal branch, the one of less distance to
x = 0.5 is unstable, while the other one is stable.
Note that part 3 in Theorem 3 infers that there is potentially an unstable segment between
segments of the principal branch. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5. Though this case is
weaker than other cases, this does not hinder us from designing a controlling mechanism as we are
going to do in Section 5.3.
10
Figure 4: In a coordination game with
aY < bY and low Ty.
Figure 5: In a coordination game with
aY < bY and high TY . There is a non-
stable segment on the principal branch.
4.4 Non-coordination games
Due to space constraint, the analysis for non-coordination games is deferred to Appendix C.
5 Mechanism Design
5.1 Hysteresis Mechanism: Select the Best Nash Equilibrium via QRE Dynam-
ics
In this section, we consider the class of coordination games, and when the socially optimal state is
one of the PNEs. The main task for us in this case is to determine when and how we can get to the
socially optimal PNE. In Example 1, by sequentially changing Tx, we move the equilibrium state
from around (0, 0) to around (1, 1), which is the social optimum state. We formalize this idea as
the hysteresis mechanism and present it in Theorem 4. The hysteresis mechanism mainly takes
advantage of the hysteresis effect we have discussed in Section 4, that we use transient changes of
system parameters to induce permanent improvement to system performance via optimal equilibrium
selection.
Theorem 4 (Hysteresis Mechanism). Given a 2× 2 game, if it satisfies the following property:
1. Its diagonal form satisfies aX , bX , aY , bY > 0.
2. Exactly one of its pure Nash equilibrium is the socially optimal state.
Without loss of generality, we can assume aX ≥ bX . Then, there is a mechanism to control the
system to the social optimum by sequentially changing Tx and Ty if 1) aY ≥ bY and 2) the socially
optimal state is (0, 0) do not hold at the same time.
Proof. First, note that if aY ≥ bY , by Theorem 1 the principal branch is always in the region
x > 0.5. As a result, once Ty is increased beyond the critical temperature, the system state will no
longer return to x < 0.5 at any positive temperature. Therefore, (0, 0) cannot be approached from
any state in x > 0.5 through the QRE dynamics.
On the other hand, if aY ≥ bY and the socially optimal state is the PNE (1, 1), then we can
approach that state by first getting onto the principal branch. The mechanism can be described as
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(C1) (a) Raise Tx to some value above the critical temperature TC(Ty).
(b) Reduce Tx and Ty to 0.
Though in this case, the initial choice of Ty does not affect the result, if the social designer is taking
the costs from assigning large Tx and Ty into account, he is going to trade off between TC and Ty
since typically smaller Ty induces larger TC .
Next, consider aY < bY . If we are aiming for state (0, 0), then we can do the following:
(D1) (a) Keep Ty at some value below TI =
bY −aY
2 ln(aX/bX)
. Now the principal branch is at (0, 0.5).
(b) Raise Tx to some value above the critical temperature TC(Ty).
(c) Reduce Tx to 0.
(d) Reduce Ty to 0.
On the other hand, if we are aiming for state (1, 1), then the following procedure suffices:
(D2) (a) Keep Ty at some value above TI =
bY −aY
2 ln(aX/bX)
. Now the principal branch is at (0.5, 1).
(b) Raise Tx to some value above the critical temperature TC(Ty).
(c) Reduce Tx to 0.
(d) Reduce Ty to 0.
Note that in the last two steps only by reducing Ty after Tx keeps the state around x = 1. We
recommend the reader to refer to Figure 11 for case (D1), and Figure 12 for case (D2) for more
insights.
5.2 Efficiency of QREs: An example
A question that arises with the solution concept of QRE is does QRE improves social welfare? Here
we show that the answer is yes. We begin with an example to illustrate:
Example 2. Consider a standard coordination game with the payoff matrices of the form
A =
(
 1
0 1 + ′
)
, B =
(
1 +  0
1 ′
)
(8)
where  > ′ > 0 are some small numbers. Note that in this game, there are two PNEs (x, y) = (1, 1)
and (x, y) = (0, 0), with social welfare 1 + 2 and 1 + 2′, respectively. We can see that for small
 and ′, the socially optimal state is (x, y) = (1, 0), with social welfare 2. In this case, the state
(x, y) = (1, 1) is the PNE with the best social welfare. However, we are able to achieve the state
with the better social welfare than any NE through QRE dynamics. We illustrate the social welfare
of the QREs with different temperatures of this example in Figure 6. In this figure, we can see
that at PNE, which is the point Tx = Ty = 0, the social welfare is 1 + 2. However, we are able to
increase the social welfare by increasing Ty. We will show in Section 5.3 a general algorithm to
find the particular temperature, as well as a mechanism, which we refer to it as the optimal control
mechanism, that drives the system to the desired state.
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Figure 6: The left figure is the social welfare on the principal branch for Example 2, and the
right figure is the illustration when TX = 0. We can see that by increasing Ty, we can obtain an
equilibrium with the higher social welfare than the best Nash equilibrium (which is Tx = Ty = 0)
Figure 7: Set of QRE achievable states
for Example 2.
Figure 8: Social welfare for all states in
Example 2.
5.3 Optimal Control Mechanism: Better Equilibrium with Irrationality
Here, we show a general approach to improve the PoS bound for coordination games from Nash
equilibria by QREs and Q-learning dynamics. We denote QRE(Tx, Ty) as the set of QREs with
respect to Tx and Ty. Further, denote QRE as the set of the union of QRE(Tx, Ty) over all positive
Tx and Ty. Also, denote the set of pure Nash equilibria system states as NE. Since the set NE is
the limit of QRE(Tx, Ty) as Tx and Ty approach zero, we have the bounds:
PoA(QRE) ≥ PoA(NE), PoS(QRE) ≤ PoS(NE)
Then, we define QRE achievable states:
Definition 8. A state (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 is a QRE achievable state if for every  > 0, there exist
positive finite Tx and Ty and (x
′, y′) such that |(x′, y′)− (x, y)| <  and (x′, y′) ∈ QRE(Tx, Ty).
Note that with this definition, pure Nash equilibria are QRE achievable states. However, the
socially optimal states do not necessary to be QRE achievable. For example, we illustrate in Figure 7
the set of QRE achievable states for Example 2. We can find that the socially optimal state,
(x, y) = (1, 0), is not QRE achievable. Nevertheless, it is easy to see from Figure 7 and Figure 8
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Figure 9: Set of QRE achievable states
for a coordination game with aY < bY .
Figure 10: Stable QRE achievable states
for a coordination game with aY > bY .
that we can achieve a higher social welfare at (x, y) = (1, 0.5), which is a QRE achievable state.
Formally, we can describe the set of QRE achievable states as the positive support of T IX and T
I
Y :
S =
{{
x ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, y ∈
[
bX
aX + bX
, 1
]}
∪
{
x ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, y ∈
[
0,
bX
aX + bX
]}}
∩
{{
x ∈
[
bY
aY + bY
, 1
]
, y ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]}
∪
{
x ∈
[
0,
bY
aY + bY
]
, y ∈
[
0,
1
2
]}}
An example for the region of a game with aY ≥ bY is illustrated in Figure 7. For the case aY < bY ,
we demonstrate it in Figure 9.
In the following theorem, we propose the optimal control mechanism for a general process to
achieve an equilibrium that is better than the PoS bound from Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5 (Optimal Control Mechanism). Given a 2×2 game, if it satisfies the following property:
1. Its diagonal form satisfies aX , bX , aY , bY > 0.
2. None of its pure Nash equilibrium is the socially optimal state.
Without loss of generality, we can assume aX ≥ bX . Then,
1. there is a stable QRE achievable state whose social welfare is better than any Nash equilibrium.
2. there is a mechanism to control the system to this state from the best Nash equilibrium by
sequentially changing Tx and Ty.
Proof. Note that given those properties, there are two PNEs (0, 0) and (1, 1). Since we know neither
of them is social optimum, the socially optimal state must lies on either (0, 1) or (1, 0).
First, consider aY ≥ bY . In this case, we know from Theorem 3 that all x ∈ (0.5, 1) states
belong to a principal branch for some Ty > 0 and are stable. While for x < 0.5, not all of them are
stable. We illustrate the region of stable QRE achievable states in Figure 10. By Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3, we can infer that the states near the border x = 0 are stable. As a result, we can claim
that the following states are what we are aiming for:
(A1) If (1, 1) is the best NE and (0, 1) is the SO state, then we select (0.5, 1).
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(A2) If (1, 1) is the best NE and (1, 0) is the SO state, then we select (1, 0.5).
(A3) If (0, 0) is the best NE and (0, 1) is the SO state, then we select
(
0, bXaX+bX
)
.
(A4) If (0, 0) is the best NE and (1, 0) is the SO state, then we select
(
bY
aY +bY
, 0
)
.
It is clear that these choices of states makes improvements on the social welfare. It is known
that for the class of games we are considering, the price of stability is no greater than 2. In fact, in
case A1 and A2, we reduce this factor to 4/3. Also in case A3 and A4, we reduce this factor to(
1
2 +
bX/2
aX+bX
)−1
.
The next step is to show the mechanism to drive the system to the desired state. Due to
symmetry, we only discuss case A1 and A3, where case A2 and case A4 can be done analogously.
For case A1, the state corresponds to the temperature Tx →∞ and Ty → 0. For any small δ > 0,
we can always find the state (0.5 + δ, 1− δ) on the principal branch of some Ty. This means that we
can achieve this state from any initial state, not only from the NEs. With the help of the first form
representation of the QREs in (5), given any QRE achievable system state (x, y), we are able to
recover them to corresponding temperatures through T IX and T
I
Y . The mechanism can be described
as follows:
(A1) (a) From any initial state, raise Tx to T
I
X(0.5 + δ, 1− δ).
(b) Decrease Ty to T
I
Y (0.5 + δ, 1− δ)
For case A3, the state we selected is not on the principal branch. This means that we cannot
increase the temperatures too much; otherwise the system state will move to the principal branch
and will never return. We assume initially the system state is at (δ, δ) for some small δ > 0, which
is some state close to the best NE. Also, we can assume the initial temperatures are Tx = T
I
X(δ, δ)
and Ty = T
I
Y (δ, δ). Our goal is to arrive at the state
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
for some small δ1 > 0 and
δ2 > 0 such that
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
is stable. We present the mechanism in the following:
(A3) (a) From initial state (δ, δ), move Tx to T
I
X
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
.
(b) Increase Ty to T
I
Y
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
Here note that Step (b) should not be proceeded before Step (a) because as we increase Ty first,
then we are taking the risks of getting off to the principal branch.
Next, consider the case that aY < bY . Similarly to the previous case, we know from Theorem 2
and Theorem 3 that states near the borders x = 0, 0.5, 1 and y = 0, 0.5, 1 are basically stable states.
Hence, we can claim the following results:
(B1) If (1, 1) is the best NE and (0, 1) is the SO state, then we select
(
bY
aY +bY
, 1
)
.
(B2) If (1, 1) is the best NE and (1, 0) is the SO state, then we select (1, 0.5).
(B3) If (0, 0) is the best NE and (0, 1) is the SO state, then we select
(
0, bXaX+bX
)
.
(B4) If (0, 0) is the best NE and (1, 0) is the SO state, then we select (0.5, 0).
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Figure 11: Phase 1 for case (B3), where
we keep low TY but increase TX .
Figure 12: Phase 2 for case (B3), where
we increase TY .
It is clear that these choices of states create improvement on the social welfare. An interesting
result for this case is that basically these desired states can be reached from any initial state. Due
to symmetry, we demonstrate the mechanisms for case (B3) and (B4), and the remaining ones can
be done analogously.
For case (B3), we are aiming for the state
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
for some small δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0.
We propose the following mechanism:
(B3) Phase 1: Getting to the principal branch.
(a) From any initial state, fix Ty at some value less than TI =
bY −aY
2 ln(aX/bX)
.
(b) Increase Tx above the critical temperature TC(Ty).
(c) Decrease Tx to T
I
x
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
.
Phase 2: Staying at the current branch.
(d) Increase Ty to T
I
Y
(
δ1,
bX
aX+bX
− δ2
)
.
This process is illustrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12. In phase 1, as we are keeping low Ty, meaning
the second player is of more rationality. As the first player getting more rational, he is more likely
to be influenced by the second player’s preference, and eventually getting to a Nash equilibrium.
In phase 2, we make the second player more irrational to increase the social welfare. The level of
irrationality we add in phase 2 should be capped to prevent the first player to deviate his decision.
For case (B4), since our desired state is on the principal branch, the mechanism will be similar
to case (A1).
(B4) (a) From any initial state, raise Tx to T
I
X(0.5 + δ, δ).
(b) Decrease Ty to T
I
Y (0.5 + δ, δ).
As a remark, in case (A3) and (A4), if we do not start from (δ, δ) but from some other states on
the principal branch, we can instead aim for state (0.5, 1). This state is not better than the best
Nash equilibrium, but still makes improvements over the initial state. The process can be modified
as:
(A3’) (a) From any initial state, raise Tx to T
I
X(0.5 + δ, 1− δ) (above TC(Ty)).
(b) Reduce Ty to T
I
Y (0.5 + δ, 1− δ).
16
6 Applications
6.1 Taxation
A direct application for the solution concept of QRE is to analyze the effect of taxation, which has
been discussed in Wolpert et al. [2012]. Unlike Nash equilibria, for QREs, if we multiply the payoff
matrix by some factor α, the equilibrium does change. This is because by multiplying α, effectively
we are dividing the temperature parameters by α. This means that if we charge taxes to the players
with some flat tax rate α− 1, the QREs will differ. Formally, we define the base temperature T0 as
the temperature when no tax is applied for both players. Then, we can define the tax rate for each
player as αx = 1− T0/Tx, αy = 1− T0/Ty, respectively.
Now we demonstrate how the hysteresis mechanism can be applied via taxation with Example 1.
Assume the base temperature T0 = 1, then with taxation, we can rewrite the process in Example 1
in the following form:
1. The initial state is (0.05, 0.14), where αx ≈ 0 and αy ≈ 0.5 (where Tx ≈ 1 and Ty ≈ 2).
2. Fix αy = 0.5 (where Ty = 2), and increase αx to 0.8, where Tx = 5 and there is only one QRE
correspondence.
3. Fix αy = 0.5 (where Ty = 2), and decrease αx back to 0 (where Tx = 1). Now x ≈ 0.997.
6.2 Evolution of metabolic phenotypes in cancer
Evolutionary Game Theory has been instrumental in studying evolutionary aspects of the somatic
evolution that characterize’s cancer progression. Tomlinson and Bodmer were the first to explore the
role of cell-cell interactions in cancer. This pioneering work was followed by others that expanded
on those initial ideas to study the role of key aspects of cancer evolution like the role of space
Kaznatcheev et al. [2015] treatment Basanta et al. [2012], Kaznatcheev et al. [2016] or metabolism
Basanta et al. [2008], Kianercy et al. [2014]. With regards to Kianercy’s work, it shows how
microenvironmental heterogeneity impacts somatic evolution, in this case by optimizing the genetic
instability to better tune cell metabolism to the dynamic microenvironment.
Our techniques (the hysteresis mechanism and the optimal control mechanism) can be applied
to the cancer game Kianercy et al. [2014] with two types of tumor phenotypic strategies: hypoxic
cells and oxygenated cells. These cells inhabit regions where oxygen could be abundant or lacking.
In the former, oxygenated cells with regular metabolism thrive but in the latter, hypoxic cells whose
metabolism is less reliant on the presence of oxygen (but more on the presence of glucose) have
higher fitness.
7 Connection to previous works
Recently, there has been a growing interplay between game theory, dynamical systems, and computer
science. Particular such examples include the integration of replicator dynamics and topological
tools Panageas and Piliouras [2016], Papadimitriou and Piliouras [2016], Piliouras et al. [2014]
in algorithmic game theory, and Q-learning dynamics Watkins and Dayan [1992] in multi-agent
systems Tan [1993]. Q-learning dynamics has been studied extensively in game settings e.g. by
Sato et al. in Sato and Crutchfield [2003] and Tuyls et al. in Tuyls et al. [2003]. In Coucheney
et al. [2013] Q-learning dynamics is considered as an extension of replicator dynamics driven by a
combination of payoffs and entropy. Recent advances in our understanding of evolutionary dynamics
in multi-agent learning can be found in the survey Bloembergen et al. [2015].
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We are particularly interested in the connection between the Q-learning dynamics and the
concept of QRE McKelvey and Palfrey [1995] in game theory. In Cominetti et al. [2010] Cominetti et
al. study this connection in traffic congestion games. The hysteresis effect of Q-learning dynamics
was first identified in 2012 by Wolpert et al. Wolpert et al. [2012]. Kianercy et al. in Kianercy
and Galstyan [2012] observed the same phenomenon, and provided discussions on the bifurcation
diagrams in 2× 2 games. The hysteresis effect has been also been highlighted in recent follow-up
work by Kianercy et al. [2014] as a design principle for future cancer treatments. It was also studied
in Romero [2015] in the context of minimum-effort coordination games. However, our current
understanding is still mostly qualitative and in this work we have pushed towards a more practically
applicable quantitative, algorithmic analysis.
Analyzing the characteristics of various dynamical systems has also been attracting the attention
of the computer science community in recent years. For example, besides the Q-learning dynamics,
the (simpler) replicator dynamics has been studied extensively due to its connections Kleinberg
et al. [2011], Papadimitriou and Piliouras [2016], Piliouras and Shamma [2014] to the multiplicative
weight update (MWU) algorithm in Kleinberg et al. [2009].
Finally, a lot of attention has also been devoted to biological systems and their connections to
game theory and computation. In recent work by Mehta et al. Mehta et al. [2016], the connection
with genetic diversity was discussed in terms of the complexity of predicting whether genetic diversity
persists in the long run under evolutionary pressures. This paper builds upon a rapid sequence
of related results Chastain et al. [2013, 2014], Livnat et al. [2008, 2014], Mehta et al. [2015], Meir
and Parkes [2015]. The key result is Chastain et al. [2013, 2014] where effectively it was made
clear that there exists a strong connection between studying replicator dynamics in games and
standard models of evolution. Follow-up works show how to analyze dynamics that incorporate
errors (i.e. mutations) Mehta et al. [2017] and how these mutations can have a critical effect to
ensuring survival in the presence of dynamically changing environments. Our paper makes progress
along these lines by examining how noisy dynamics can introduce such as bifurcations.
We were inspired by recent work by Kianercy et al. establishing a connection between cancer
dynamics and cancer treatment and studying Q-learning dynamics in games. This is analogous to
the connections Chastain et al. [2013, 2014], Livnat and Papadimitriou [2016] between MWU and
evolution detailed above. It is our hope that by starting off a quantitative analysis of these systems
we can kickstart similarly rapid developments in our understanding of the related questions.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we perform a quantitative analysis of bifurcation phenomena connected to Q-learning
dynamics in the class of 2× 2 games. Based on this analysis, we introduce two novel mechanisms,
the hysteresis mechanism and the optimal control mechanism. Hysteresis mechanisms use transient
changes to the system parameters to induce permanent improvements to its performance via
optimal (Nash) equilibrium selection. Optimal control mechanisms induce convergence to states
whose performance is better than even the best Nash equilibrium, showing that by controlling the
exploration/exploitation tradeoff we can achieve strictly better states than those achievable by
perfectly rational agents.
We believe that these new classes of mechanisms could lead to interesting and new questions
within game theory as well as a more thorough understanding of cancer biology.
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9 Supplementary materials
A From Q-learning to Q-learning Dynamics
In this section, we provide a quick sketch on how we can get to the Q-learning dynamics from
Q-learning agents. We start with an introduction to the Q-learning rule. Then, we discuss the
multi-agent model when there are multiple learners in the system. The goal for this section is to
identify the dynamics of the system in which there are two learning agents playing a 2× 2 game
repeatedly over time.
A.1 Q-learning Introduction
Q-learning Watkins and Dayan [1992], Watkins [1989] is a value-iteration method for solving the
optimal strategies in Markov decision processes. It can be used as a model where users learn about
their optimal strategy when facing uncertainties. Consider a system that consists of a finite number
of states and there is one player who has a finite number of actions. The player is going to decide
his strategy over an infinite time horizon. In Q-learning, at each time t, the player stores a value
estimate Q(s,a)(t) for the payoff of each state-action pair (s, a). Then, he chooses his action at+1 that
maximizes the Q-value Q(st,·)(t) for time t+ 1, given the system state is st at time t. In the next
time step, if the agent plays action at+1, he will receive a reward r(t+ 1), and the value estimate is
updated according to the rule:
Q(st,at+1)(t+ 1) = (1− α)Q(st,at+1)(t) + α(r(t+ 1) + γmax
a′
Q(st+1,a′)(t))
where α is the step size, and γ is the discount factor.
A.2 Joint-learning Model
Next, we consider the joint learning model as in Kianercy and Galstyan [2012]. Suppose there are
multiple players in the system that are learning concurrently. Denote the set of players as P . We
assume the system state is a function of the action each player is playing, and the reward observed
by each player is a function of the system state. Their learning behaviors are modeled as simplified
models based on the Q-learning algorithm described above. More precisely, we consider the case
that each player assumes the system is only of one state, which corresponds to the case that the
player has very limited memory, and has discount factor γ = 0. The reward observed by player
i ∈ P given he plays action a at time t is denoted as ria(t). We can write the updating rule of the
Q-value for agent i as follows:
Qia(t+ 1) = Q
i
a(t) + α[r
i
a(t)−Qia(t)]
For the selection process, we consider the mechanism that each player i ∈ P selects his action
according to the Boltzmann distribution with temperature Ti:
xia(t) =
eQ
i
a(t)/Ti∑
a′ e
Qi
a′ (t)/Ti
(9)
where xia(t) is the probability that agent i chooses action a at time t. The intuition behind this
mechanism is that we are modeling the irrationality of the users by the temperature parameter
Ti. For small Ti, the selection rule corresponds to the case of more rational agents. We can see
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that for Ti → 0, (9) corresponds to the best-response rule, that is, each agent selects the action
with the highest Q-value with probability one. On the other hand, for Ti →∞, we can see that (9)
corresponds to the selection rule of selecting each action uniformly at random, which models the
case of fully-irrational agents.
A.3 Continuous-time dynamics
This underlying Q-learning model has been studied in the previous decades. It is known that
if we take the time interval to be infinitely small, this sequential joint learning process can be
approximated as a continuous-time model (Sato and Crutchfield [2003], Tuyls et al. [2003]) that
has some interesting characteristics. To see this, consider the 2× 2 game as we have described in
Section 2.1. The expected payoff for the first player at time t given he chooses action a can be
written as rxa(t) = [Ay(t)]a, and similarly, the expected payoff for the second player at time t given
he chooses action a is rya(t) = [Bx(t)]a. The continuous-time limit for the evolution of the Q-value
for each player can be written as
Q˙xa(t) = α[r
x
a(t)−Qxa(t)]
Q˙ya(t) = α[r
y
a(t)−Qya(t)]
Then, we take the time derivative of (9) for each player to get the evolution of the strategy profile:
x˙i =
1
Tx
xi
(
Q˙xi −
∑
k
xkQ˙
x
k
)
y˙i =
1
Ty
yi
(
Q˙yi −
∑
k
ykQ˙
y
k
)
Putting these together, and rescaling the time horizon to αt/Tx and αt/Ty respectively, we obtain
the continuous-time dynamics:
x˙i = xi
[
(Ay)i − xTAy + Tx
∑
j
xj ln(xj/xi)
]
(10)
y˙i = yi
[
(Bx)i − yTBx+ Ty
∑
j
yj ln(yj/yi)
]
(11)
A.4 The exploration term increases entropy
Now, we show that the exploration term in the Q-learning dynamics results in the increase of the
entropy:
Lemma 2. Suppose A = 0 and B = 0. The system entropy
H(x,y) = H(x) +H(y) = −
∑
i
xi lnxi −
∑
i
yi ln yi
for the dynamics (2) increases with time, i.e.
H˙(x,y) > 0
if x and y are not uniformly distributed.
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Proof of Lemma 2. It is equivalent that we consider the single agent dynamics:
x˙i = xiTx
[
− lnxi +
∑
j
xj lnxj
]
Taking the derivative of the entropy H(x), we have
H˙(x) =
∑
i
(− lnxi − 1)x˙i = −Tx
[
−
∑
i
xi(lnxi)
2 +
(∑
j
xi lnxi
)2]
and since we have
∑
i xi = 1, by Jensen’s inequality, we can find that(∑
j
xi lnxi
)2
≤
∑
i
xi(lnxi)
2
where equality holds if and only if x is a uniform distribution. Consequently, if we have xi ∈ (0, 1),
and x is not a uniform distribution, H˙(x) is strictly positive, which means that the system entropy
increases with time.
B Convergence of dissipative learning dynamics in 2× 2 games
Liouville’s formula
Liouville’s formula can be applied to any system of autonomous differential equations with a
continuously differentiable vector field V on an open domain of S ⊂ Rk. The divergence of V at x ∈ S
is defined as the trace of the corresponding Jacobian at x, i.e., div[V (x)] ≡∑ki=1 ∂Vi∂xi (x) = tr(DV (x)).
Since divergence is a continuous function we can compute its integral over measurable sets A ⊂ S
(with respect to Lebesgue measure µ on Rn). Given any such set A, let φt(A) = {φ(x0, t) : x0 ∈ A} be
the image of A under map Φ at time t. φt(A) is measurable and its measure is µ(φt(A))) =
∫
φt(A)
dx.
Liouville’s formula states that the time derivative of the volume φt(A) exists and is equal to the
integral of the divergence over φt(A):
d
dt [A(t)] =
∫
φt(A)
div[V (x)]dx. Equivalently:
Theorem 6 (Sandholm [2010], page 356). ddtµ(φt(A)) =
∫
φt(A)
tr(DV (x))dµ(x)
A vector field is called divergence free if its divergence is zero everywhere. Liouville’s formula
trivially implies that volume is preserved in such flows.
This theorem extends in a straightforward manner to systems where the vector field V : X → TX
is defined on an affine set X ⊂ Rn with tangent space TX. In this case, µ represents the Lebesgue
measure on the (affine hull) of X. Note that the derivative of V at a state x ∈ X must be represented
using the derivate matrix DV (x) ∈ Rn×n, which by definitions has rows in TX. If Vˆ : Rn → Rn is
a C1 extension of V then DV (x) = DVˆ (x)PTX , where PTX ∈ Rn×n is the orthogonal projection2
of Rn onto the subspace TX.
Poincare´-Bendixson theorem
The Poincare´-Bendixson theorem is a powerful theorem that implies that two-dimensional systems
cannot effectively exhibit chaos. Effectively, the limit behavior is either going to be an equilibrium,
a periodic orbit, or a closed loop, punctuated by one (or more) fixed points. Formally, we have:
2To find the matrix of the orthogonal projection onto TX (or any subspace Y of Rn) it suffices to find a basis
(~v1, ~v2, . . . , ~vm). Let B be the matrix with columns ~vi, then P = B(B
TB)−1BT .
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Theorem 7 (Bendixson [1901], Teschl [2012]). Given a differentiable real dynamical system defined
on an open subset of the plane, then every non-empty compact ω-limit set of an orbit, which contains
only finitely many fixed points, is either a fixed point, a periodic orbit, or a connected set composed
of a finite number of fixed points together with homoclinic and heteroclinic orbits connecting these.
Bendixson-Dulac theorem
By excluding the possibility of closed loops (i.e., periodic orbits, homoclinic cycles, heteronclinic
cycles) we can effectively establish global convergence to equilibrium. The following criterion, which
was first established by Bendixson in 1901 and further refined by French mathematician Dulac in
1933, allows us to do that. It is typically referred to as the Bendixson-Dulac negative criterion. It
focus exactly on planar system where the measure of initial conditions always shrinks (or always
increases) with time, i.e., dynamical systems with vector fields whose divergence is always negative
(or always positive).
Theorem 8 (Mu¨ller and Kuttler [2015], page 210). Let D ⊂ R2 be a simply connected region and
(f, g) in C1(D,R) with div(f, g) = ∂f∂x +
∂g
∂y being not identically zero and without change of sign in
D. Then the system
dx
dt
= f(x, y),
dy
dt
= g(x, y)
has no loops lying entirely in D.
The function ϕ(x, y) is typically called the Dulac function.
Remark: This criterion can also be generalized. Specifically, it holds for the system:
dx
dt
= ρ(x, y)f(x, y),
dy
dt
= ρ(x, y)g(x, y)
if ρ(x, y) > 0 is continuously differentiable. Effectively, we are allowed to rescale the vector field
by a scalar function (as long as this function does not have any zeros), before we prove that the
divergence is positive (or negative). That is, it suffices to find ρ(x, y) > 0 continuously differentiable,
such that (ρ(x, y)f(x, y))x + (ρ(x, y)g(x, y))y possesses a fixed sign.
By Kianercy and Galstyan [2012] we have that the after a change of variables, uk =
ln(xk+1)
lnx1
,
vk =
ln(yk+1)
ln y1
for k = 1, . . . , n− 1, the replicator system transforms to the following system:
u˙k =
∑
j aˆkje
vj
1 +
∑
j e
vj
− Txuk, v˙k =
∑
j aˆkje
uj
1 +
∑
j e
uj
− Txvk, (II)
where aˆkj = ak+1,j+1 − a1,j+1, bˆkj = bk+1,j+1 − a1,j+1.
In the case of 2 × 2 games, we can apply both the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem as well as
the Bendixson-Dulac theorem, since the resulting dynamical system is planar and ∂u˙1∂u1 +
∂v˙1
∂v1
=
−(Tx + Ty) < 0. Hence, for any initial condition system (II) converges to equilibria. The flow
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of original replicator system in the 2 × 2 game is diffeomorhpic3 to the flow of system (II), thus
replicator dynamics with positive temperatures Tx, Ty converges to equilibria for all initial conditions
as well.
C Bifurcation Analysis for Games with Only One Nash Equilib-
rium
In this section, we present the results for the class of games with only one Nash equilibrium, where
it can be either a pure one or a mixed one, where the mixed Nash equilibrium is defined as
Definition 9 (mixed Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile (xNE , yNE) is a mixed Nash equilibrium
if
xNE ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
xTAyNE , yNE ∈ arg max
y∈[0,1]
yTBxNE
This corresponds to the case that at least one of bX , aY , or bY being negative. Similarly, our
analysis is based on the second form representation described in (6) and (7), which demonstrates
insights from the first player’s perspective.
C.1 No dominating strategy for the first player
More specifically, this is the case when there is no dominating strategy for the first player, i.e.
both aX and bX are positive. From (7) we can presume that the characteristics of the bifurcation
diagrams depends on the value of aY + bY since it affects whether y
II is increasing with x or not.
Also, we can find some interesting phenomenon from the discussion below.
First, we consider the case when aY + bY > 0. This can be considered as a more general case as
we have discussed in Section 4.3. In fact, the statements we have made in Theorem 1, Theorem 2,
and Theorem 3 applies to this case. However, there are some subtle difference we should be noticed.
If aY > bY , where we can assume bY < 0, then by the second part of Theorem 2, there are no
QRE in x ∈ (0, 0.5), since TB now is a negative number. This means that we always only have the
principal branch. On the other hand, if aY < bY , where we can assume aY < 0, then similar to the
example in Figure 4 and Figure 5, there could still be two branches. However, we can presume
that the second branch vanishes before Ty actually goes to zero, as the state (1, 1) is not a Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 9. Given a 2 × 2 game in which the diagonal form has aX , bX > 0, aY + bY > 0, and
aY < bY , and given Ty, if Ty < TA, where TA =
−aY
ln(aY /bY )
, then there are no QRE correspondence
in x ∈ (0.5, 1).
The proof of the above theorem directly follows from Proposition 4 in the appendix. An
interesting observation here is that we can still make the first player get to his desired state by
changing Ty to some value that is greater than TA.
3 A function f between two topological spaces is called a diffeomorphism if it has the following properties: f is
a bijection, f is continuously differentiable, and f has a continuously differentiable inverse. Two flows Φt : A→ A
and Ψt : B → B are diffeomorhpic if there exists a diffeomorphism g : A → B such that for each x ∈ A and t ∈ R
g(Φt(x)) = Ψt(g(x)). If two flows are diffeomorphic then their vector fields are related by the derivative of the
conjugacy. That is, we get precisely the same result that we would have obtained if we simply transformed the
coordinates in their differential equations Meiss [2007].
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Figure 13: No dominating strategy for
the first player, with aY + bY < 0 and
low TY .
Figure 14: No dominating strategy for
the first player, with aY + bY < 0 and
high TY .
Next, we consider aY + bY ≤ 0. The bifurcation diagram is illustrated in Figure 13 and Figure 14.
We can find that in this case the principal branch directly goes toward its unique Nash equilibrium.
We present the results formally in the following theorem, where the proof follows from Section D.1.2
in the appendix.
Theorem 10. Given a 2× 2 game in which the diagonal form has aX , bX > 0, aY + bY ≤ 0, QRE
is unique given Tx and Ty.
C.2 Dominating strategy for the first player
Finally, we consider the case when there is a dominating strategy for the first player, i.e. bX < 0.
According to Figure 15 and Figure 16, the principal branch seems always goes towards x = 1. This
means that the first player always prefers his dominating strategy. We formalize this observation, as
well as some important characteristics for this case in the theorem below, where the proof can be
found in Section D.2 in the appendix.
Theorem 11. Given a 2× 2 game in which the diagonal form has aX > 0, bX < 0, aX + bX > 0,
and given Ty, the following statements are true:
1. The region (0, 0.5) contains the principal branch.
2. There are no QRE correspondence for x ∈ (0.5, 1).
3. If aY + bY < 0 or aY > bY , then the principal branch is continuous.
4. If aY + bY > 0 and bY > aY , then the principal branch may not be continuous.
As we can see from Theorem 11, for the most cases, the principal branch is continuous. One
special case is when aY + bY > 0 with bY > aY . In fact, this can be seen as a duality, i.e. flipping
the role of two players, of the case we have discussed in part 3 of Theorem 9, where for Ty is within
TA and TI , there can be three QRE correspondences.
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Figure 15: When there is a dominating
strategy for the first player, with aY +
bY < 0.
Figure 16: When there is a dominating
strategy for the first player, with aY +
bY > 0 and aY < bY .
D Detailed Bifurcation Analysis for General 2× 2 Game
In this section, we provide technical details for the results we stated in Section 4.3 and Section C.
Before we get into details, we state some results that will be useful throughout the analysis in the
following lemma. The proof of this lemma is straightforward and we omit it in this paper.
Lemma 3. The following statements are true.
1. The derivative of T IIX is given as
∂T IIX
∂x
(x, Ty) =
−(aX + bX)L(x, Ty) + bX
x(1− x)[ln(1/x− 1)]2 (12)
where
L(x, Ty) = y
II + x(1− x) ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
(13)
2. The derivative of yII is given as
∂yII
∂x
= yII(1− yII)aY + bY
Ty
3. For x ∈ (0, 1/2) ∪ (1/2, 1), ∂T IIX∂x > 0 if and only if L(x, Ty) < bXaX+bX ; on the other hand,
∂T IIX
∂x < 0 if and only if L(x, Ty) >
bX
aX+bX
.
D.1 Case 1: bX ≥ 0
First, we consider the case bX ≥ 0. As we are going to show in Proposition 1, the direction of
the principal branch relies on yII(0.5, Ty), which is the strategy the second player is performing,
assuming the first player is indifferent to his payoff. The idea is that if yII(0.5, Ty) is large, then it
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means that the second player pays more attention to the action that the first player thinks better.
This is more likely to happen when the second player has less rationality, i.e. high temperature Ty.
On the other hand, if the second player pays more attention to the other action, the first player is
forced to choose that as it gets more expected payoff.
We show that for Ty > TI , the principal branch lies on x ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
, otherwise the principal branch
lies on x ∈ (0, 12). This result follows from the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For case 1, if Ty > TI , then we have y
II(1/2, Ty) >
bX
aX+bX
, and hence
lim
x→ 1
2
+
T IIX (x, Ty) = +∞ and lim
x→ 1
2
−
T IIX (x, Ty) = −∞
On the other hand, if Ty < TI , then we have y
II(1/2, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
, and hence
lim
x→ 1
2
+
T IIX (x, Ty) = −∞ and lim
x→ 1
2
−
T IIX (x, Ty) = +∞.
Proof. First, consider the case that bY > aY , then, we can see that for Ty > TI =
bY −aY
2 ln(aX/bX)
:
yII
(
1
2
, Ty
)
=
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2Ty
)−1
>
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2TI
)−1
=
(
1 +
aX
bX
)−1
=
bX
aX + bX
Then, for the case that aY > bY , we can see that
yII
(
1
2
, Ty
)
=
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2Ty
)−1
>
(
1 + e0
)−1
=
1
2
≥ bX
aX + bX
For the case that aY = bY , since we assumed aX 6= bX , we have
yII
(
1
2
, Ty
)
=
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2Ty
)−1
=
(
1 + e0
)−1
=
1
2
>
bX
aX + bX
As a result, the numerator of (6) at x = 12 is negative for Ty > TI , this proves the first two limit.
For the rest two limits, we only need to consider the case bY > aY , otherwise TI = 0, which is
meaningless. For bY > aY and Ty < TI , we can see that
yII
(
1
2
, Ty
)
=
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2Ty
)−1
<
(
1 + e
bY −aY
2TI
)−1
=
(
1 +
aX
bX
)−1
=
bX
aX + bX
This makes the numerator of (6) at x = 12 positive and proves the last two limits.
D.1.1 Case 1a: bX ≥ 0, aY + bY > 0
In this section, we consider a relaxed version of the class of coordination game as in Section 4.3. We
prove theorems presented in Section 4.3, and showing that these results can in fact be extended to
the case that aY + bY > 0, instead of requiring aY > 0 and bY > 0.
First, we can find that as aY + bY > 0, y
II is an increasing function of x, meaning
∂yII
∂x
= yII(1− yII)aY + bY
Ty
> 0
This implies that both player tend to agree to each other. Intuitively, if aY ≥ bY , then both player
agree with that the first action is the better one. For this case, we can show that no matter what
Ty is, the principal branch lies on x ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
. In fact, this can be extended to the case whenever
Ty > TI , which is the first part of Theorem 1.
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Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 1. We can find that for Ty > TI , we have y
II(1/2, TY ) >
bX
aX+bX
for
any Ty according to Proposition 1. Since y
II is monotonic increasing with x, we have yII > bXaX+bX
for x > 1/2. This means that we have T IIX > 0 for any x ∈ (1/2, 1). Also, it is easy to see that
limx→1− T IIX = 0. As a result, we can find that (0.5, 1) contains the principal branch.
For Case 1a with aY ≥ bY we can observe that on the principal branch, the lower the Tx, the
more x is close to 1. We are able to show this monotonicity characteristics in Proposition 2, which
can be used to justify the stability owing to Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. In Case 1a, if aY ≥ bY , then ∂T
II
X
∂x < 0 for x ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
.
Proof. It suffices to show that L(x, Ty) >
bX
aX+bX
for x ∈ (12 , 1). Note that according to Prop 1, we
have if aY ≥ bY ,
L(1/2, Ty) = y
II(1/2, Ty) ≥ 1
2
≥ bX
aX + bX
(14)
Since yII(x, Ty) is monotonic increasing when aY + bY > 0, y
II(x, Ty) >
1
2 for x ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
. As a
result, we have 1− 2yII < 0, and hence we can see that for x ∈ (12 , 1),
∂L
∂x
=
[
(1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY + bY
Ty
]
ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
> 0
Consequently we have that for x ∈ (12 , 1), L(x, Ty) > bXaX+bX , and hence ∂T IIX∂x < 0 according to
Lemma 3.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3. According to Lemma 1, Proposition 2 implies that all x ∈ (0.5, 1) is
on the principal branch. This directly leads us to part 1 of Theorem 3.
Next, if we look into the region x ∈ (0, 1/2), we can find that in this region, QREs appears only
when Tx and Ty is low. This observation can be formalized in the proposition below. We can see
that this proposition directly proves part 2 and 3 of Theorem 2, as well as part 2 of Theorem 3.
Proposition 3. Consider Case 1a. Let x1 = min
{
1
2 ,
−Ty ln
(
aX
bX
)
+bY
aY +bY
}
and TB =
bY
ln(aX/bX)
. The
following statements are true for x ∈ (0, 1/2):
1. If Ty > TB, then T
II
X < 0.
2. If Ty < TB, then T
II
X > 0 if and only if x ∈ (0, x1).
3. ∂L∂x > 0 for x ∈ (0, x1).
4. If Ty < TI , then
∂T IIX
∂x > 0.
5. If Ty > TI , then there is a nonnegative critical temperature TC(Ty) such that T
II
X (x, TY ) ≤
TC(Ty) for x ∈ (0, 1/2). If TY < TB, then TC(Ty) is given as T IIX (xL), where xL ∈ (0, x1) is
the unique solution to L(x, Ty) =
bX
aX+bX
.
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Proof. For the first and second part, consider any x ∈ (0, 1/2), and we can see that
T IIX > 0⇔ yII <
bX
aX + bX
⇔
(
1 + e
1
Ty
(−(aY +bY )x+bY )
)−1
<
bX
aX + bX
⇔ x < min
12 , −Ty ln
(
aX
bX
)
+ bY
aY + bY

Note that for Ty >
bY
ln(aX/bX)
= TB, we have x1 < 0, and hence TX < 0.
From the above derivation we can see that for all x ∈ (0, 1/2) such that T IIX (x, Ty) > 0, we have
yII < 1/2 since bXaX+bX < 1/2. Then, we can easily find that
∂L
∂x
=
[
(1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY + bY
Ty
]
ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
> 0.
Further, when Ty < TI , we have y
II(1/2, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
. This implies that for x ∈ (0, 1/2),
yII(x, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
. Since ∂L∂x > 0, and L is continuous, we can see that L(x, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
for
x ∈ (0, 1/2). This implies the fourth part of the proposition.
Next, if we look at the derivative of T IIX ,
∂T IIX
∂x
(x, Ty) =
−(aX + bX)L(x, Ty) + bX
x(1− x)[ln(1/x− 1)]2
we can see that any critical point in x ∈ (0, 1/2) must satisfy L(x, Ty) = bXaX+bX . When Ty >
TI , x1 < 1/2, and we can see that L(x1, Ty) > y
II(x1, Ty) =
bX
aX+bX
. If Ty <
bY
ln(aX/bX)
, then
limx→0+ TX = yII(0, TY ) < bXaX+bX . Hence, there is exactly one critical point for TX for x ∈ (0, x1),
which is a local maximum for TX . If Ty >
bY
ln(aX/bX)
, then we can see that TX is always negative, in
which case the critical temperature is zero.
The results in Proposition 3 not only applies for the case aY ≥ bY but also general cases about
the characteristics on (0, 1/2). According to this proposition, we can conclude the following things
for the case aY ≥ bY , as well as the case aY < bY when Ty > TI :
1. The temperature TB =
bY
ln(aX/bX)
determines whether there is a branch appears in x ∈ (0, 1/2).
2. There is some critical temperature TC . If we raise Tx above TC , then the system is always on
the principal branch.
3. The critical temperature TC is given as the solution to the equality L(x, TY ) =
bX
aX+bX
.
When there is a positive critical temperature, though it has no closed form solution, we can perform
binary search to look for x ∈ (0, x1) that satisfies L(x, Ty) = bXaX+bX .
Another result we are able to obtain from Proposition 3 is that the principal branch for Case 1a
when Ty < TI lies on (0, 1/2).
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 1. First, we note that Ty < TI is meaningful only when bY > aY ,
for which case we always have TI < TB. From Proposition 3, we can see that for T
II
Y < TI ,
we have x1 = 1/2, and hence T
II
X > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1/2). From Proposition 1, we already have
lim
x→ 1
2
− T IIX =∞. Also, it is easy to see that limx→0+ T IIX = 0. As a result, since T IIX is continuous
differentiable over (0, 0.5), for any Tx > 0, there exists x ∈ (0, 0.5) such that T IIX (x, Ty) = Tx.
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What remains to show is the characteristics on the side (1/2, 1) when bY > aY . In Figure 4
and Figure 5, we can find that for low Ty, the branch on the side (1/2, 1) demonstrated a similar
behavior as what we have shown in Proposition 3 for the side (0, 1/2). However, for high Ty, while
we still can find that (0, 1/2) contains the principal branch, the principal branch is not continuous.
These observations are formalized in the following proposition. From this proposition, the proof of
part 4 of Theorem 2 directly follows.
Proposition 4. Consider Case 1a with bY > aY . Let x2 = max
{
1
2 ,
−TY ln
(
aX
bX
)
+bY
aY +bY
}
and TA =
max
{
0, −aYln(aX/bX)
}
. The following statements are true for x ∈ (1/2, 1).
1. If Ty < TA, then T
II
X < 0.
2. If Ty > TA, then T
II
X > 0 if and only if x ∈ (x2, 1).
3. For x ∈
[
bY
aY +bY
, 1
)
, we have ∂L∂x > 0.
4. If Ty ∈ (TA, TI), then there is a positive critical temperature TC(Ty) such that T IIX (x, Ty) ≤
TC(Ty) for x ∈ (1/2, 1), given as TC(Ty) = T IIX (xL), where xL ∈ (1/2, 1) is the unique solution
of L(x, Ty) =
bX
aX+bX
.
Proof. For the first part and the second part, consider x ∈ (1/2, 1), and we can find that
T IIX > 0⇔ yII >
bX
aX + bX
⇔
(
1 + e
1
Ty
(−(aY +bY )x+bY )
)−1
>
bX
aX + bX
⇔ x > max
12 , −Ty ln
(
aX
bX
)
+ bY
aY + bY
 = x2
Note that for Ty > TI , we get x2 = 1/2. Also, if Ty < TA, then T
II
X < 0 for all x ∈ (1/2, 1).
For the third part, that yII ≥ 12 for all x ≥ bYaY +bY and
bY
aY +bY
> 12 . Then, we can find that
∂L
∂x
=
[
(1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY + bY
Ty
]
ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
> 0
For the fourth part, we can find that any critical point of L(x, TY ) in (0, 1) must be either x =
1
2
or satisfies the following equation:
(1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY + bY
Ty
= 0 (15)
Consider G(x, Ty) = (1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY +bYTy . For bY > aY , yII(1/2, Ty) is strictly less
than 1/2. Also, we can see that bYaY +bY > 1/2. Now, we can observe that G(1/2, Ty) > 0 and
G( bYaY +bY , Ty) < 0. Next, we can see that G(x, Ty) is monotonic decreasing with respect to x for
x ∈
(
1
2 ,
bY
aY +bY
)
by looking at its derivative:
∂G(x, Ty)
∂x
= −2 + aY + bY
Ty
[
(1− 2x)(1− 2yII)− 2x(1− x)∂y
II
∂x
]
< 0
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As a result, we can see that there is some x∗ ∈
(
1
2 ,
bY
aY +bY
)
such that G(x∗, Ty) = 0. This implies that
L(x, Ty) has exactly one critical point for x ∈
(
1
2 ,
bY
aY +bY
)
. Besides, we can see that if G(x, Ty) > 0,
∂L
∂x < 0; while if G(x, Ty) < 0, then
∂L
∂x > 0. Therefore, x
∗ is a local minimum for L.
From the above arguments, we can conclude that the shape of L(x, Ty) for Ty < TI is as follows:
1. There is a local maximum at x = 1/2, where L(1/2, Ty) = y(1/2, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
.
2. L is decreasing on the interval
(
1
2 , x
∗), where x∗ is the unique solution to (15).
3. L is increasing on the interval (x∗, 1). If Ty > TA, then limx→1− L(x, Ty) = y(1, Ty) >
bX
aX+bX
.
Finally, we can claim that there is a unique solution to L(x, TY ) =
bX
aX+bX
, and such point gives a
local maximum to T IIX .
The above proposition suggests that for Ty ∈ (TA, TI), we are able to use binary search to find
the critical temperature. For Ty > TI , unfortunately, with the similar argument of Proposition 4,
we can find that there are potentially at most two critical points for T IIX on (1/2, 1), as shown in
Figure 5, which may induce an unstable segment between two stable segments. This also proves
part 3 of Theorem 3.
Now, we have enough materials to prove the remaining statements in Section 4.3.
Proof of Part 1, 5, and 6 of Theorem 2, part 4 of Theorem 3. For Ty > TI , by Proposition 3, we
can conclude that for x ∈ (0, xL), we have ∂T
II
X
∂x > 0, for which the QREs are stable by Lemma 1. With
similar argument we can conclude that the QREs on x ∈ (xL, x1) are unstable. Besides, given Tx, the
stable QRE xa ∈ (0, xL) and the unstable xb ∈ (xL, x1) that satisfies T IIX (xa, Ty) = T IIX (xb, Ty) = Tx
appear in pairs. For Ty < TI , with the same technique and by Proposition 4, we can claim that the
QREs in x ∈ (x2, xL) are unstable; while the QREs in x ∈ (xL, 1) are stable. This proves the first
part of of Theorem 2 and part 4 of Theorem 3.
Part 5 and 6 of Theorem 2 are corollaries of part 5 of Proposition 3 and part 4 of Proposition 4.
D.1.2 Case 1b: bX > 0, aY + bY < 0
In this case, both player have different preferences. For the game within this class, there is only one
Nash equilibrium (either pure or mixed). We presented examples in Figure 13 and Figure 14. We
can find that in these figures, there is only one QRE given Tx and Ty. We show in the following two
propositions that this observation is true for all instances.
Proposition 5. Consider Case 1b. Let x3 = max
{
0,
−Ty ln(aX/bX)+bY
aY +bY
}
. If Ty < TI , then the
following statements are true
1. T IIX (x, Ty) < 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1).
2. T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈
(
x3,
1
2
)
.
3.
∂T IIX (x,Ty)
∂x > 0 for x ∈
(
x3,
1
2
)
.
4.
(
x3,
1
2
)
contains the principal branch.
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Proof. Note that if Ty < TI , we have x3 < 1/2. Also, according to Proposition 2, y
II(1/2, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
. Since yII is continuous and monotonic decreasing with x, we can see that yII < bXaX+bX
for x > 1/2. Therefore, the numerator of (6) is always positive for x ∈ (1/2, 1), which makes T IIX
negative. This proves the first part of the proposition.
For the second part, observe that for x ∈ (0, 1/2), T IIX > 0 if and only if yII < bXaX+bX . This is
equivalent to x >
−Ty ln(aX/bX)+bY
aY +bY
.
For the third part, note that for x ∈ (0, 1/2), x(1 − x) ln(1/x − 1)∂yII∂x < 0. This implies
L(x, Ty) < y
II(x, Ty) <
bX
aX+bX
for x ∈ (x3, 1/2), from which we can conclude that ∂T
II
X (x,Ty)
∂x > 0.
Finally, we note that if x3 > 0, then T
II
X (x3, Ty) = 0. If x3 = 0, we have limx→0+ T
II
X = 0. As a
result, we can conclude that (x3, 1/2) contains the principal branch.
With the similar arguments, we are able to show the following proposition for Ty > TI :
Proposition 6. Consider Case 1b. Let x3 = min
{
1,
−Ty ln(aX/bX)+bY
aY +bY
}
. If Ty > TI , then the
following statements are true
1. T IIX (x, Ty) < 0 for x ∈ (0, 1/2).
2. T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈
(
1
2 , x3
)
.
3.
∂T IIX (x,Ty)
∂x < 0 for x ∈
(
1
2 , x3
)
.
4.
(
1
2 , x3
)
contains the principal branch.
D.1.3 Case 1c: aY + b+ Y = 0
In this case, we have TI =
bY
ln(aX/bX)
, and yII is a constant with respect to x. The proof of Theorem 10
for aY + bY = 0 directly follows from the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Consider Case 1c. The following statements are true:
1. If Ty < TI , then T
II
X (x, Ty) < 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1), and T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 0.5).
2. If Ty > TI , then T
II
X (x, Ty) < 0 for x ∈ (0, 0.5), and T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1).
3. If Ty < TI , then
∂T IIX (x,Ty)
∂x > 0 for x ∈ (0, 0.5).
4. If Ty > TI , then
∂T IIX (x,Ty)
∂x < 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1).
Proof. Note that yII =
(
1 + ebY /Ty
)−1
.
First consider the case when aY > bY . In this case TI = 0 and bY < 0. Therefore, y
II > bXaX+bX ,
and from which we can conclude that T IIX > 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1) and T IIX < 0 for x ∈ (0, 0.5), for any
positive Ty.
Now consider the case that aY < bY . If Ty < TI , we have y
II < bXaX+bX , and hence we get
T IIX (x, Ty) < 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1), and T IIX (x, Ty) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 0.5), which is the first part of the
proposition statement. Similarly, if Ty > TI , we have y
II > bXaX+bX , from which the second part of
the proposition follows.
For the third part and the fourth part, note that L(x, Ty) = y
II in this case as ∂y
II
∂x = 0 by
observing (13), and the sign of the derivative of T IIX can be seen from Lemma 3.
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D.2 Case 2: bX < 0
In this case, the first action is a dominating strategy for the first player. Note that both −(aX + bX)
and bX are not positive, which means that the numerator of (6) is always smaller than or equal to
zero. This implies that all QRE correspondences appear on x ∈ (12 , 1). In fact, since yII > 0 for
x ∈ (1/2, 1), the numerator of (6) is always negative, we have T IIX > 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1). Also we can
easily see that
lim
x→ 1
2
+
T IIX (x, Ty) = +∞
This implies that (1/2, 1) contains the principal branch. First, we show the result when
aY + bY < 0 in the following proposition. Also, the bifurcation diagram is presented in Figure 15.
Proposition 8. For Case 2, if aY + bY < 0, then for x ∈ (1/2, 1), we have ∂T
II
X
∂x < 0.
Proof. In this case, yII is monotonic decreasing with x. We can see that
L(x, TY ) = y
II + x(1− x) ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII
∂x
> yII > 0
since x(1 − x) ln ( 1x − 1) ∂yII∂x is positive for x ∈ (1/2, 1). Bringing this back to (12), we have
∂T IIX
∂x < 0.
For aY + bY > 0, if aY > bY , the bifurcation diagram has the similar trend as in Figure 15; while
if aY < bY , we lose the continuity on the principal branch.
Proposition 9. For Case 2, if aY + bY > 0, then for x ∈ (1/2, 1), we have
1. if aY > bY , then
∂T IIX
∂x < 0.
2. if aY < bY , then TX has at most two local extrema.
Proof. In this case, yII is monotonic increasing with x. For aY > bY , we can find that y
II(1/2, Ty) >
0 and L(1/2, Ty) = y
II(1/2, Ty) > 0. Also, we can get that L is monotonic increasing for x ∈ (1/2, 1)
by inspecting
∂L(x, Ty)
∂x
=
[
(1− 2x) + x(1− x)(1− 2yII)aY + bY
Ty
]
ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
∂yII(x, Ty)
∂x
> 0
Hence, for x ∈ (1/2, 1), L(x, Ty) > 0. This implies ∂T
II
X
∂x < 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1).
For the second part, we can find that for aY < bY , y
II(1/2) < 1/2. Let x2 = min
{
1, bYaY +bY
}
.
First note that if x2 < 1, then for x > x2, we have y > 1/2, and further we can get
∂L(x,Ty)
∂x > 0
for x ∈ (x2, 1). We use the same technique as in the proof of the Proposition 4. Let G(x, Ty =
(1 − 2x) + x(1 − x)(1 − 2yII)aY +bYTy . Note that G(1/2, Ty) > 0 and G(x2, Ty) < 0. Next, observe
that G(x, Ty) is monotonic decreasing for x ∈
(
1
2 , x2
)
. Hence, there exists a x∗ ∈ (1/2, x2) such that
G(x∗, Ty) = 0. This x∗ is a local minimum for L. We can conclude that for x ∈ (1/2, 1), L has the
following shape:
1. There is a local maximum at x = 1/2, where L(1/2, Ty) = y(1/2, Ty) > 0.
2. L is decreasing on the interval x ∈ (1/2, x∗), where x∗ is the solution to G(x∗, Ty) = 0.
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3. L is increasing on the interval x ∈ (x∗, x2). Note that limx→1− L(x, Ty) = yII(1, Ty) > 0.
As a result, if L(x∗, Ty) > bXaX+bX , then T
II
X is monotonic decreasing; otherwise, T
II
X has a local
minimum and a local maximum on (1/2, 1).
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